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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of ROGER P. ADAMS.
Petitioner.
-againstGEORGE B. ALEXANDER, Commissioner
of the Division of Parole; and ANDREW
CUOMO, State Attorney General,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 0 1-09-STO 1 13 Index No. 1642-09
Appearances :

Roger P. Adams
Inmate No. 86-B-04 15
Petitioner, Pro Se
Oneida Correctional Facility
6 100 School Road
Rome, NY 13440
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(C. Harris Dague,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
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The petitioner, an inmate at Oneida Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated February 20.
2008 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. In 1985 the petitioner was convicted

of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of twenty years
to life. During his incarceration he was convicted of two counts of assault in the second
degree and sentenced to a term of two and one half to five years, running concurrently to
each other but consecutively to the murder conviction. Among the many arguments set forth
in the petition, petitioner contends that (1) the determination of the Parole Board was

”excessive”; (2) the Parole Board placed undue emphasis on the crimes for which he was
convicted, and failed to consider positive factors supporting his release; (3) the Parole
Board’s determination was stated in conclusory terms; (4) the Parole Board violated
petitioner’s due process rights; (5) the Parole Board determination was influenced by
political pressure and public opinion; (6) there were errors in the hearing minutes which
affected his due process rights; (7) the hearing was untimely; (8) the petitioner was not
provided a “proper” hearing; (9) the parole determination did not have a sound and
substantial basis in the record; (101 the Parole Board relied upon improper documentation
during the parole interview; and (1 1) the Parole Board’s decision was pre-determined.
The petitioner maintains that the Parole Board, in relying upon the seriousness of the
crime for which he is incarcerated, has re-sentenced him to an additional term of
imprisonment. He asserts that it was improper for the Parole Board to rely upon his poor
institutional disciplinary record. In his view the Parole Board failed to consider his efforts
ilt

reIi,iM!I ; I I ion. He indicates that he successfully completed the AK i and AbA 1 programs,
2
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as well as programming and/or employment as an auto-mechanic, a sign-maker, a building
maintenance worker, a porter, an industries worker. a pantry and mess hall worker, a program
aide, a vocational drafting employee and a member of a paint crew.
The petitioner maintains that the Parole Board’s decision was conclusory and nonfactual. He argues that the Parole Board violated his rights to due process in that it followed
an alleged policy of the administration of former Governor George Pataki to deny parole to
violent felony offenders. He also asserts that the parole interview was untimely as it was not
held at least one month prior to his parole date. He maintains that the transcript of the parole
interview contains errors. He maintains that the parole interview was illegal in that only two
members of the Parole Board were present.
The petitioner asserts that he has demonstrated his remorse for his crime, as shown
by

his programing in such areas as alternatives to violence.

As evidence of his

rehabilitation, he indicates he has made charitable contributions to (and participates in)
Tomorrow’s Children Marathon Fund. He also donates to the Make A Wish Foundation.
He contends that his sentencing minutes are incomplete. In his view the Parole Board’s
decision was predetermined.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“After a review of your rec ord, a personal interview, and
deliberation, parole is denied. Your program completions and
release plans are noted. The sentencing minutes you provided
have also been considered. Your criminal conduct includes
convictions for murder 2”ddegree and assault 2nddegree. When
this is considered with your poor disciplinary record, which
includes numerous tickets for creating disturbances, violating
direct orders, fighting and violent conduct; and requiredlrelevant
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factors, it is concluded that your discretionary release at this
time is incompatible with the welfare of the community and
inappropriate at this time.”
Turning first to a threshold issue, the Court notes that the petitioner has made a motion
for assignment of counsel. The Court finds that his motion must be denied. In cases such
as the instant one, there is no authority for the assignment of counsel without compensation
(-see. Matter of Smiley, 36 NY2d 433 [ 19751; Wills v City ofTroy, 258 AD2d 849, [3d Dept.,

19991).
Turning to the merits stated in Executive Law 8259-i (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
perfoiiiiance, if any, as a panticipant in a twipordry Ideabe
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
rcpiesmtative [I” (Executive Law 9259-i [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
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200 11). If the parole board's decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,
the board's determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
supra). Furthermore, only a "showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety" on the part

of the Parole Board has been found to necessitatejudicial intervention (see Matter of Silinon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Rd. of
Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence of the abcy"e, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parok Board (see Matter of Peje7 v,
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record, A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner's institutional programming and his plans upon release. He was afforded
ample opportunity to speak on his own behalf. The transcript appears to be sufficient on its
face, and is more than adequate for purposes of providing meaningful review. The Court
finds that the transcript of the parole interview satisfied the requirements of Executive Law

6 259-i ( 6 ) (d,
Gi.diilm v NLLV
Yolk State Divisiclu of Pdiule, 269 AD2d 628 [3'd D ~ y i . ,
20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex rel. Grimaldij-Warden, 174 AD2d 497 [First
Dept., 19911, lv to appeal denied 78 NY2d 858; see also, Matter of Reynoso v Cooinbe, 229
AD2d 732. 733 [3rd Dept., 19961, Iv denied 89 NY2d 801 ). In addition, under the rules of
the Division of Parole, it is proper for the interview to be conducted by a panel of two Board
members

(see 9 NYCRR 8002.2 [b]).

1 he

decision of the Parole Board was sufticiently detailed to inform the petitioner of
5
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the reasons for the denial ofparole and it satisfied the requiianents of Executive Law $259-i
(-see Matter of Siao-Pao. 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of \!.t+\ehead

v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825

[3rd Dept.. 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Di-&ion of Parole, 199 AD2d 677
[3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the
seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (mMatter of Weir v. New York
State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., !9941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New
York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra: Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d
863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight
to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly
discuss each one (seeMatter CI! \\

1 1 \~ h 15

’1 L)iilb t , i i ~L ~ J‘ ;~ 1 ~ UL
1 1Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd

Dept., 20081). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the
first sentence of Executive Law $ 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see_&!atter of Silvero v Dennison, 28
AD3d 859 [3rdDept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give
considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the
other statutory factors, in determining whcthcr thc individu!

‘17,

ill I i l L‘ cind rcmain at l i h r t y

without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v NewKork State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
i 1rill 1c:gaId u ihe sciitcnLing mimics, it appKau3 i i o i i i
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Parole made a good faith effort to obtain the minutes from the office of the Albany County
Clerk, but that they are no longer available. Notably hoivever, the petitioner submitted a
reasonably complete copy of the sentencing minutes which reveals that Albany County Court
Judge Joseph Harris harbored absolutely no sympathy for the petitioner. In particular Judge
Harris expressly stated that he wanted any future Parole Board to know that the petitioner
had reneged on his plea bargain by not cooperating with the prosecution, and that he had
shown no remorse for his crime.’ Under such circumstances the Court finds that there has
been substantial compliance with Executive Law 259-i (2) (c) (A). in that relevant portions
of the sentencing minutes were considered.
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit

(see LLiLLCi’ ~11U

~ L I ~1 kL i I i 1 . ~ 1 -bidid
1~

Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961;Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has
xrved his or her minimum smtence doc; not confer upon the inmate a protected libGrty
interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1 1 14. 1 1 15 [3rdDept.,
20081). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of

‘Judge Harris stated the following: “My recommendation to the Parole Board is that when
[Detitioner’s murder victim] rises from the grave and tells the Parole Board that it’s all rig-ht with

him for you to go free, that’s soon enough.” Incredibly, the petitioner commented during his
parole interview “. . .the Judge. . . he didn’t like mefor some reason.” (emphasis supplied)
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petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141. 1142 [3rdDept.. 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]:
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly. finds no merit to the argument

(see Matter of

Lue-Shim v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept.. 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter ofLittle v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rdDept., 20051,
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rdDept., 20061; Matter of Motti v Dennison,
38 AD3d 1030, 1031 [3rdDep., 20071; Matter of Garofolo v Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 [3rd
Dept., 20081; Matter of MacKenzie v Dennison,

AD3d -366

NYS2d 384 [3rdDept.,

October 22,20081). Nor does the Court find that there is any evidence that the Parole Board
decision was otherwise predetermined. There is no evidence in the record that political
pressure played a role in the Parole Board's determination..
With r q x c t to petitionsr's argument that the A p p d s Unit failccl to issue a timely
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial
review of the underlying determination

(see 9 NYCRR fj8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York

State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rdDept, 20001, Iv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex
ici. 1jiei

v 1~

d u 209
,

Au2d U J U

[jrd
Oept.,

2C)OOj).
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Turning to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to due
process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the constitution

of either the United States or the State of New York

(see Greenholtz v Inmates of the

Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1,7 [ 19791;Matter of Russo v New York
State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,73. supra). It has been repeatedly held that Executive Law

5

259-i does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate expectation of,

release; therefore. no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by the Parole
Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (e
Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169, 17 1 [2d
Cir.. 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40,44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d
661, 664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 516 F Supp 1367, 1367-1368 [SD NY,
19811; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 75-76, supra, Matter

of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v New York State
Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court, accordingly, finds no
due process violation.

In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board's discrctioii arid was supported by the rccord (seeMatter vfTatla
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98
NY2d 604).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
h w h l procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The

9
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petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court. by separate order,
is senlin; all records submitted for in camera rcview.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, that petitioner’s motion for assignment of counsel be and hereby is
denied; and it is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER
October 1 ,2009
Troy, New York

Dated:

Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr

Papers Considered:
1.

2.
3.

Order To Show Cause dated March 11,2009, Petition. Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Petitioner’s Affidavit In Support of Motion For Assignment of Counsel
Respondent’s Answer dated May 12,2009, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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